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Abstract 
The paper investigates the level of competition in the loans and deposit market of 
the Nigerian commercial banking sector in the post re-capitalization period 2007-
2011 using Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and Concentration Ratio (CR). 
The weighted average reveals that in the deposit market 3 banks control 39.4% 
and in the loans market 2 banks provide 19%. The HHI result of 1073 in the 
deposit market and 2419 in the loans market infers that the level of competition is 
higher in the deposit market than the loans market. The Nigerian banking 
industry is neither highly competitive nor experiencing acute market 
concentration.   
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1.0 Introduction 
There have been fundamental changes in the structure of banks in Nigeria in the 
last two decades with more emphasis on the entry conditions and management 
of risk assets.  In the beginning of the year 2000 there were 54 deposit money 
banks licensed to operate in Nigeria.  The number rose sharply to 90 in 2002 and 
dropped to 25 in 2005 as a result of an upward review in the minimum share 
capital of deposit money banks initiated by the regulatory authorities (CBN 
2006).  
The main dictate of the consolidation process was announced by the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in the middle of year 2004. It pronounced a new 
minimum share capital for deposit money banks in Nigeria, with increase, to a 
minimum of N25 Billion with effect from 1st of January 2006 (CBN 2004). At the 
close of the consolidation exercise, a pre-consolidation and aggregate 
capitalization of the Nigerian deposit money banks rose in a big lump from 
N311billion to N932billion (Ibru 2007).  
The Nigerian banking firms operates majorly a branch banking type. And with 
about 20 licensed banks presently operating out of the 25 initially licensed at the 
dawn of 2006 a total number of 5799 branches are widely located in urban and 
less urban cities (CBN 2010).  
The traditional approach to assessing competition has been to associate a larger 
number of firms with more price competition and fewer firms with less-
competitive behavior. This thought is from a classic industrial organization 
argument, which assumes that there is a causal relationship running from the 
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structure of the market (e.g., firm concentration) to the firm’s pricing behavior, to 
the firm’s profits, and to its degree of market power. The chances of a firm’s 
domination of the market among other factors are determined by the market 
power of the bank or the degree of competition in the market. The higher the 
degree of competition, the less market power a bank has and vice-versa.  
The location of banks’ various branches in the state capitals and some lesser cities 
in various parts of Nigeria is expected to promote competition and also provide 
consumers a wide choice of determining a banking product (e.g. saving and term 
deposits) that would maximize their returns and to a wider extent which bank to 
patronize for deposit and credit needs.  
Claessens and Laeven (2004) have shown that the degree of competition in the 
banking sector is important among other reasons like efficiency in delivering 
financial services and to improve the access of firms and households to financial 
services and external financing. Researchers therefore determine the level of 
competition amongst firms through concentration measures, such as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), the sum of market shares of the n largest 
banks (CR- n), Panzar and Rosse model, and some others. Such indicators are 
relevant since high concentration is usually associated with non-competitive 
practices, or the formation of collusion among market participants (Martins 
2012). 
The analyses and estimation of degree of competitions for deposits and loans in a 
local market was conducted by Berger and Hannan (1989) and Hannan (1997); 
they employ HHI and found that a negative correlation exists between 
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concentration and interest paid to depositors. This infers that market 
concentration may be a plausible indirect measure of firms’ market power. De 
Bandt and Davis (2000), Shaffer (1994), and Bikker and Haaf (2002) examined the 
impact of banking consolidation and competition in the United States of America. 
Their results reveals that consolidation in the US banking market was mostly 
driven by markets as merger was perceived as one way to improve their 
diversification, efficiency or possibly market power.  
For European banking markets Maudos and de Guevara (2004) found a 
statistically significant positive correlation between concentration and bank 
interest margins for the period 1993–2000. In the Latin America Lau (1982) and 
Nekane (2001) on their respective study applied the Structure Conduct 
Performance Approach method with the assumption that each type of credit is an 
independent market. They found that the Brazilian banking market is highly 
competitive but reject the hypothesis of perfect competition.   
Asogwa (2003) relied on a simultaneous equation model developed in the New 
Empirical Industrial Organization Literature formed by a cost equation and a 
supply equation in order to identify the degree of market power exhibited in the 
banking market in Nigeria. He discovered competition is stronger among large 
banks and weaker among small banks and intermediate among medium-sized 
banks. Ayeni (2013) adopted a different analytical method (Panzar and Rosse) 
and found that banks in Nigeria operate in an averagely monopolistic 
competitive market. 
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Our study investigates the level of competition after the 2006 consolidation and 
mergers resulting from review of minimum capital of commercial banks in 
Nigeria. And also determines whether the exercise engenders a competitive loan 
and credit markets or an enhancement of market power in the commercial 
banking sector. The rest of the paper is divided into four parts. Part two discusses 
the recent developments in the Nigerian Banking Industry. Part three provides 
the theoretical background. Part four is on data analysis and findings. And part 
five contains the conclusion. 
 
2.0 The Nigerian Commercial Banking Industry: Overview of the Reform 
Efforts 
The reform agenda prescribed by the regulatory authorities for the Nigerian 
banking sector over time situates the reform measures in this sub-sector under 
three broad categories: (i) policies to improve the efficiency and competition in 
the sector; (ii) policies to strengthen the prudential framework and bank 
supervision; and (iii) policies to develop and deepen money market. 
These policies directly or otherwise affect the banking market structure and the 
level of competition. The first category of policy  by government, is comprised of 
dismantling interest rate controls on deposits and loans, dropping of directed 
credit schemes to priority sectors and later (late 80s), withdrawals of  accounts of  
all Federal and State Government Ministries, Departments and Parastatals from 
commercial banks to Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN, 1989). This action of 
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government is meant to create a level playing field for all banks and disallow 
undue preference to those who hold government funds in the loans market.  
The regulated interest rate structure of the CBN was modified in November 1989 
with a view to remove the distortion in the interest rate structure. And a 
modified regulated structure replaced the earlier method. In the new 
dispensation banks were allowed a maximum spread of 4 percentage points 
between the prime and highest lending rates, (CBN, 1991).  
 In the 1991 fiscal year, to foster competition and promote efficient allocation of 
financial resources banks were required to link their lending rates to their 
average cost of funds by maintaining a 4 per cent spread above the average cost 
of funds subject to a maximum lending rate of 21 per cent and observe a floor of 
13.5 per cent on savings deposit (CBN, 1992).  
The interest rate policy adopted by CBN was meant to improve the operations of 
the money market. In line with the policy of interest deregulation, banks deposit 
and lending rates were market determined. The performance criterion was that 
banks should observe a maximum spread of per cent points (determined by 
CBN) between their average cost of funds and their lending rates. The cap on 
interest rate adopted in 1993 was maintained in 1994 and 1995 and was retained 
for most of 1996. In the later part of 1996 the rule changed when the CBN asked 
banks to maintain a maximum spread of 7.5 per cent points between their deposit 
and lending rates subject to a maximum lending rate of 21 per cent.  
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The Minimum Rediscount Rate (MRR) which is to serve as the nominal anchor 
for determining other rates ranges between 9%- 12.17% between 2006 and 2008 
respectively. 
 It is noteworthy that interest rates have remained relatively stable since 
December 2006 when Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) replaced the Minimum 
Rediscount Rate (MRR) under the new monetary policy implementation 
framework (CBN, 2007).  
In the wake of 2008, the global financial crisis was felt in Nigeria through lower 
oil prices and sharp decline in the performance of the stock market. Though, 
Nigerian banks were not fully integrated into the international banking arena but 
due to sharp decline in the domestic stock prices some of the banks whose shares 
were quoted suffered a setback.  
In view of this the CBN ordered a special examination of all commercial banks in 
June 2009.The result of the exercise was that out of the 24 banks operating, 10 
were found weak. Consequently, directors of 8 banks were replaced and a sum of 
Six Hundred and Twenty Billion Naira (#620.00Bn) was injected to aid domestic 
liquidity (CBN 2009). 
This exercise affected the pricing structure of deposit and loans in the market. 
Even the MPR declined to 4.68% in 2009 from 12.17% in 2008. And by 2010 it was 
8.03%.  The average prime and maximum loan rates for banks also declined from 
19.05% down to 15.74% and from 23.77% to 21.86% respectively (CBN 2010).   
Another impact of this regulatory actions is that the remaining banks regarded as 
“healthy” by the regulatory authorities face more pressure as customers of weak 
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banks “migrate funds” to purchase banking products like savings, demand and 
time deposits. Also, they face easy access criterion condition based on distance of 
a bank from its customers; i.e. the preference for a bank might just be based on 
the proximity of a bank’s branch to its prospective competitor.  
The entry into banking industry like most banking industry around the globe is 
regulated in Nigeria. Bank license is issued (based on specific conditions) and 
withdrawn or suspended (in cases of violation of banking rules or laws and or 
bank illiquidity or mismanagement etc) by the regulatory authority.  
Against this premise, efforts of government to regulate the sector came about in 
1952 when the first enactment; i.e. Nigerian Banking Ordinance was promulgated 
followed by the CBN Act 1959. The Acts over time had witnessed fresh 
enactments and several amendments. Some of which are Banks and Other 
Financial Institutions Act 1991 (BOFIA), Central Bank of Nigeria Act 1991, 
Nigerian Deposit Insurance Act of 1988 and a host of others. Other reforms in the 
regulatory framework included the introduction of Prudential Guidelines in 1990 
to disallow banks from making current income from delinquent loans.  
The essence of these enactments and subsequent amendments to the various acts 
were to address the following issues; review the conditions of entry into banking 
business, review the capital base of banks on regular basis, reduce insider abuses 
leading to granting unsecured and delinquent loans, streamline licensing 
procedures, ensuring adequate supervision of banking business, secure 
depositors funds through insurance scheme  and above all maintenance of a 
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better and improved services to consumers in a competitive banking 
environment. (CBN Annual Reports).  
 
3.0 Theoretical Background 
Market structures can be classified in two fundamental forms – Perfect competition 
and Imperfect Competition. Within this framework, those treated as special cases 
are Monopoly, Oligopoly Duopoly and Monopolistic Competition which are less 
than perfect. The theoretical expositions of the structure of markets as it relates to 
banking firms are discussed below.    
The assumptions of Chamberlin (1933) as it relates to banking firms is that, 
“each”  “product” is differentiated by another by name of the bank or by the 
individuality of the establishment in which it is sold, including its location (as 
well as  trademarks, quality, etc.)”. The large number of branches of banks in the 
market and the possibility of entry (though difficult) and exit of many banks, 
provide the competitive elements. ‘Each “product” is subject to the competition 
of the other products sold under different circumstances and at other locations. 
In the limit case of the monopolistic competition model, where banks’ products 
are regarded as perfect substitutes of one another, the Chamberlin model 
produces the perfectly competitive solution, as demand elasticity approaches 
infinity.  
In the immediate period after Chamberlin, Mason (1939) propounded the 
traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) approach which posits that 
fewer firms in the market will generally lead to less competitive conduct, in 
10 
 
terms of higher prices and reduced output levels, simply like a monopolist 
model. Also, a concentrated market will produce less competitive performance, 
where the price ratio to cost is higher at the expense of lower consumer welfare.  
The small number of firms might also facilitate firms to collude with their 
competitors in order to boost price. In this case, market price will be much higher 
than marginal cost (Yeyati and Micco, 2003).  
The SCP model assumes that there is a single-way relationship between 
structure, conduct and performance. That is why the market structure affects the 
firms’ behavior and the firms’ behavior in turn influences the market 
performance. The causal relationship becomes unclear because firms’ decision to 
enter the market might be affected by the expectations of the degree of 
competition in the market stage (Vesalla, 1995). 
On the other hand, the competitive market will produce an efficient outcome as 
price equals marginal cost. Thus, an increase in firm numbers will lead to more 
competitive conduct by lowering price and reducing firms’ profitability. Also, the 
SCP approach believed that the competitive market, which is produced by a low 
concentration in the market, will deliver higher consumer welfare (Shaffer, 1994). 
 In the Non Structural Approach theory, the first argument against the traditional 
structure performance hypotheses came from Demzets (1973) and Pelzman 
(1977). According to them, the source of concentration is efficiency instead of 
market power. Their finding is labeled as Efficiency-Structure hypotheses. And 
they explained that the difference in firm-specific efficiencies within markets can 
create unequal market shares and high level of concentration. The difference in 
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efficiency might be derived from superior management and production 
technology (Neuberger, 1997). 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) propounded a testable postulate that is used to 
determine the level of competition in the financial market based on the 
hypothesis that  researchers  cannot rely solely on the market structure 
information alone to determine the competition level in the banking market.  
PR defines a measure of competition H as - sum of the elasticities of the reduced-
form revenues with respect to factor prices: 
                               H = 
 
m
i i
i
p
R
1
*
 
*R
Pi    .        .          .                        (1) 
Where H is the measure of competition Ri   refers to revenue of bank i, Pi is the 
factor input prices of bank i,  
The PR method is estimated by calculating the sum of elasticity of the reduced 
form revenues with respect to factor prices. The value of elasticity provides 
information about banks conduct, and is also used to determine the structure of 
the market. 
From equation 1 Panzar and Rosse was able to prove that under monopoly, an 
increase in input prices will increase marginal costs, and reduce equilibrium 
output and subsequently reduce revenues. And in such circumstance H would be 
zero or negative.  
The same outcome is also found in monopolistic competition without a threat to 
entry. But with fixed number of banks, where there are barriers to enter the 
market, the number of banks remain unchanged. Vesalla (1995) proved that in 
such market H is zero or negative. 
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4.0 Methodology 
4.1 Data Sources 
Our data for this paper are from CBN Annual Reports (Summary of Deposit 
Money Banks’ activities) and Annual Report and Accounts of the fourteen 
commercial banks in the period 2007-2011. The 14 out of 20 commercial banks 
whose annual data were used for the study represent 70 per cent population of 
commercial banks operating in Nigeria as at the end of 2011. The remaining six 
banks are classified as other banks. 
       
4.2 Method of Data Analysis 
In this paper, we employ the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and 
Concentration Ratio (CR) which has been widely employed for the examination 
of the competitive structure of the banking industry in various countries, we also 
use the bank (market leaders) concentration ratio to determine the level of market 
concentration. (See Muhamed-Zulkhibri, and Fadzlan, 2007; Mirzaei et al, 2011.) 
In our attempt to investigate the level of competition in the Nigerian commercial 
banking sector during the periods 2007-2011 we estimate the HHI to determine 
the concentration ratio in the loans and deposit market so as to determine the 
level of competition in the  market.  
The HHI is a concentration measure (constructed as the sum of the squares of the 
market share of deposits and loans) applied to determine the level of competition 
amongst the deposit money banks in Nigeria. 
The ratio is determined by the formula: 
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          HHI =  

N
i
iS
1
2                     .     .           .      (1)  
Where;  
i…..1,2,3…..n 
N no of firms operating in the local market 
S is the market share of each bank  
Decision Rule 
Increases in the Herfindahl-Hirschman index generally indicate a decrease in 
competition whereas decreases indicate the opposite. Alternatively, if whole 
percentages are used, the index ranges from 0 to 10,000. 
A HHI index below 0.01 (or 100) indicates a highly competitive index. 
A HHI index below 0.15 (or 1,500) indicates an unconcentrated index. 
A HHI index between 0.15 to 0.25 (or 1,500 to 2,500) indicates moderate 
concentration. 
A HHI index above 0.25 (above 2,500) indicates high concentration. 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Discussion of Findings 
The number of licensed commercial banks operating in Nigeria reached its peak 
in 2002. It declined from 90 in 2002 to 89 by the end of 2003. And by the end of 
2004, it had dropped to 25 licensed commercial banks (see table 1).  
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The change in the number of licensed commercial banks between 2003 and 2004 
represents a 71.91% decline in the number of operating commercial banks in 
Nigeria. The significant decline was majorly due to the capital reform exercise 
conducted by the regulatory authority (Central Bank of Nigeria).  
The trend in the number of branches of banks shows a different pattern 
compared to the number of licensed banks. The number of branches established 
by the licensed banks has been steadily growing with about 5799 branches by the 
end of 2011. Although it dropped by 13.97% between 2004 and 2005, ever since it 
has been increasing. The obvious implication of increasing number of branches is 
that access to commercial banking services becomes better as bank/customer 
ratio improves.  
The Concentration Ratio (CR) template of estimation is based on the classification 
of the banks of study in three major classifications (see table 4 for deposit market 
and table 9 for the loans market).The results of the weighted average of the 
respective class for the period of the study is represented in tables 5 and 10 for 
deposit and loans respectively.  
In the deposit market, the mean concentration ratio in the period of the study in 
respect of category A that is comprised of 3 banks was 39.4% and 13.6% for 
category B with 2 banks. While Category C with 9 banks and other banks 
maintains weighted average in the five year period at 28% and 19% respectively.    
In the loans market, the classification of banks in table 9 shows that none of the 
14 banks employed for the study made the A category while 2 banks are in 
category B and the rest are in category C. 
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The concentration of loans based on a weighted average in the 5 year period 
indicates that the highest concentration is in category C with about 40.6% of loans 
advanced by the commercial banks. The other banks had a concentration ratio of 
40.4% and the lowest concentration of 19% in category B comprising of 2 banks.      
In respect of the results of HHI in tables 11 and 12 the deposit market indicates 
an index of 1073 evidencing unconcentrated index in the deposit market while 
that of loans market is 2419 evidencing moderate concentration. The two markets 
lies in the midway between high competition and extreme concentration.  
 
5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on market competition amongst 
Nigerian commercial banks in the period 2007-2011, offering evidence with a 
model that explains the concentration or competition in the industry.  
We found no evidence, which supports that the loans or deposit markets are 
highly competitive or facing acute concentration. But our evidence supports that 
competition in the industry lies between the two extremes. We conclude that in 
spite of the re-capitalization exercise, competition in both markets is not fierce 
because the markets are not highly competitive and no single bank enjoys acute 
market concentration or market power.  
In view of our findings, we recommend as follows; regulators should improve on 
the level of competition and engender efficiency in the industry by modifying 
without necessarily reducing the standard of entry into the industry. Design 
regulatory measures that will disallow internal abuses and mismanagement that 
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causes exit of firms. And finally prevent market concentration and antitrust 
concerns by disallowing the merger of the big banks that could result in a bank 
becoming the dominant member of the market.     
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Table 1 
Number of deposit money bank and branches in Nigeria and abroad  
Year No of 
licensed 
banks 
Urban 
branches 
Rural 
Branches 
Branches 
abroad 
Total no of 
branches 
2000 54 1466 722 5 2193 
2001 90 1466 722 5 2193 
2002 90 2283 722 5 3010 
2003 89 2520 722 5 3247 
2004 25 2765 722 5 3492 
2005 25 NA NA NA 3004 
2006 25 NA NA NA 3897 
2007 25 NA NA NA NA 
2008 24 NA NA NA NA 
2009 24 NA NA NA NA 
2010 21 NA NA NA 5810 
2011 20 NA NA NA 5799 
Source: CBN statistical Bulletin 2008 and Annual Reports 2010. 
*NA means:  records not available from CBN annual reports. 
 
Table 2 
Total Deposit Liabilities of Listed Commercial Banks (7). 
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Year Access 
#Billio
n  
First 
Bank 
#Billion 
Diamon
d 
#Billion 
Eco 
#Billio
n 
Fidelit
y 
#Billio
n 
GTB 
#Billio
n 
FCMB 
#Billion 
2007 205.2 581.8 211.6 84.0 78.6 290.8 188.0 
2008 351.8 661.6 403.7 229.9 176.7 357.0 251.6 
2009 405.7 1244.0 449.0 310.7 379.7 662.3 272.6 
2010 440.5 1330.8 378.7 243.8 288.8 713.0 334.9 
2011 522.6 1783.8 544.2 215.4 327.3 964.1 410.6 
total 1925.8 5602.0 1987.2 1076.8 1251.1 2987.2 1457.7 
mean 385.16 1120.4 397.44 215.36 250.22 597.44 291.54 
Source: Annual Reports of the Commercial Banks 2007-2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Total Deposit Liabilities of Listed Commercial Banks (7). 
Year Stanbic 
#Billion 
Sterling 
#Billion 
Sky  
#Billion 
Uba 
#Billion 
Union 
#Billion 
Wema 
#Billion 
Zenith 
#Billion 
2007 72.4 75.0 269.3 897.6 417.4 125.4 568.0 
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2008 98.9 106.9 501.6 1258.0 649.3 136.1 1161.5 
2009 170.4 184.7 452.9 1151.1 782.0 94.8 1111.3 
2010 187.6 160.5 471.0 1119.1 598.9 121.5 1289.6 
2011 295.9 199.3 642.6 1216.4 399.2 147.4 1576.0 
total 825.2 726.4 2337.4 5642.2 2846.8 625.2 5706.4 
mean 165.04 145.28 467.48 1128.44 569.36 125.04 1141.28 
Source: Annual Reports of the Commercial Banks 2007-2011 
 
Table 4  
Categorization by total  Deposit Liabilities Based on the Mean of 5years 
Banks  Group A 
Above 1 
Trillion Naira 
Group B 
Below 1trillion 
Above 
#500Billion 
Group C 
Below 
 #500Billion 
1 ***   
2 ***   
3 ***   
4  **  
5  **  
6   * 
7   * 
8   * 
9   * 
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10   * 
11   * 
12   * 
13   * 
14   * 
Source: Computed by the Authors 
 
Table 5 
Concentration Ratio (CR) of Commercial Banks Deposit 2007-2011 
Year Category A 
3 Banks 
Category B 
2 Banks 
Category C 
9 Banks 
Others 
 
 
 
2007 0.41 0.14 0.26 0.19  ( 11 banks) 
2008 0.39 0.13 0.28 0.20  ( 10 banks) 
2009 0.38 0.16 0.30 0.16  ( 10 banks) 
2010 0.39 0.13 0.27 0.21  (7 Banks) 
2011 0.40 0.12 0.29 0.19  ( 6 banks) 
Mean 0.394 0.136 0.28 0.19 
Source: Computed by the Authors 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Total Loans and Advances of Listed Commercial Banks (7). 
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Year Access 
#Billion 
First 
bank 
#Billion 
Diamond 
#Billion 
ECO 
#Billion 
Fidelity 
#Billion 
FCMB 
#Billion 
GT Bank 
#Billion 
2007 107.8 219.1 96.4 52.3 38.7 83.6 113.7 
2008 244.6 437.8 231.4 116.1 70.2 186.6 291.5 
2009 391.7 1022.5 296.5 144.9 230.7 236.8 538.1 
2010 403.2 1017.4 294.9 183.7 161.3 323.5 563.5 
2011 463.1 1128.9 297.9 232.8 158.5 315.1 681.8 
total 1610.4 3825.7 1217.1 729.8 659.4 1145.6 2188.6 
mean 322.08 765.14 243.42 145.96 131.88 229.1 437.72 
Source: Annual Reports of the Commercial Banks 2007-2011 
 
Table 7 
Total Loans and Advances of Listed Commercial Banks (7). 
Year Stanbic  
#Billion 
Sterling 
#Billion 
Sky 
#Billion 
UBA 
#Billion 
Union 
#Billion 
WEMA 
#Billion 
Zenith 
#Billion 
2007 79.6 38.9 112.9 320.2 149.4 68.6 218.3 
2008 99.0 45.9 246.4 405.5 244.8 48.4 413.7 
2009 110.9 65.8 317.8 543.3 336.8 28.6 669.3 
2010 164.2 78.1 385.4 569.3 178.7 38.6 667.9 
2011 230.7 99.3 490.8 596.4 140.5 60.1 767.4 
total 684.4 328.0 1553.3 2434.7 1050.2 244.3 2736.6 
mean 136.88 65.6 310.66 486.94 210.04 48.86 547.32 
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Source: Annual Reports of the Commercial Banks 2007-2011 
Table 8 
Aggregate Loans and Deposit Liabilities of Money Deposit Banks  
Year Aggregate Deposit Aggregate Loans & 
Advances 
2007 5001.4 4993.3 
2008 7960.2 7606.1 
2009 9150.0 8451.3 
2010 9784.5 6629.6 
2011 11452.8 6489.7 
Total 43348.9 33666.0 
Mean 8669.78 6733.20 
Source: CBN Annual Reports 2011 
 
Table 9  
Categorization by Loans and Advances Based on the Mean of 5years 
 Banks Group A 
Above 1 
Trillion Naira 
Group B 
Below 1trillion 
Above 
#500Billion 
Group C 
Below 
 
#500Billion 
1  **  
2  **  
3   * 
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4   * 
5   * 
6   * 
7   * 
8   * 
9   * 
10   * 
11   * 
12   * 
13   * 
14   * 
Source: Computed by the Authors  
 
Table 10 
Concentration Ratio (CR) of Commercial Banks Advances 2007-2011 
Year Category A 
Nil- Banks 
Category B 
2 Banks 
Category 
C 
12 Banks 
Others 
 
2007  0.10 0.28 0.62  (11 
banks) 
2008  0.11 0.29 0.60 ( 10 
banks) 
2009  0.20 0.38 0.42 ( 10 
27 
 
banks)  
2010  0.25 0.50 0.25 ( 7 
banks) 
2011  0.29 0.58 0.13  (6 banks 
) 
Mean  0.19 0.406 0.404 
Source: Computed by the Authors  
Table 11  
Percentage Share of each bank’s deposit liabilities 
Name of Bank % share of commercial bank  
Deposit (S) 
Square of percentage share 
of commercial bank (S2) 
1 4.442558 19.7363 
2 12.923850 167.0259 
3 4.584120 21.0148 
4 2.484031 6.1704 
5 2.886117 8.3297 
6 3.362715 11.3079 
7 6.891063 47.4867 
8 1.903624 3.6238 
9 1.675706 2.8080 
10 5.392063 29.0743 
11 13.015786 169.4107 
12 6.567179 43.1278 
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13 1.442251 2.0801 
14 13.163887 173.2879 
Other Banks 19.203486 368.7739 
∑S2  1073.26 
Source: Computed by the Authors 
 
Table 12 
Percentage Share of each bank’s Loans and Advances 
Name of Bank % share of commercial bank  
Loans &Advances(S) 
Square of percentage share  
(S2) 
1 4..783461 22.8815 
2 11.363690 129.1335 
3 3.615220 13.0698 
4 2.167766 4.6992 
5 1.958653 3.8363 
6 3.402840 11.5793 
7 6.500921 42.2620 
8 2.032912 4.1327 
9 0.974277 0.9492 
10 4.613854 21.2876 
11 7.231925 52.3007 
12 3.119468 9.7311 
13 0.725660 0.5266 
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14 8.128676 66.0754 
Other Banks 37.895502 1436.0691 
∑S2  2418.53 
Source: Computed by the Authors 
 
 
